The Pakistan delegation is pleased to see you preside over the second year of the Commission's substantive session. My delegation also extends felicitations to the members of the Bureau and to the chairs of the two Working Groups. We assure our full support and cooperation to you and the chairs of the two Groups.
One, none of the five Nuclear Weapons States appears ready to foreswear nuclear weapons;
Two, some nuclear weapon states are seeking to develop new nuclear weapons, contravening their commitments and increasing the danger of the use of nuclear weapons;
Three, the CTBT which was supposed to be a central pillar for advancement of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation has no realistic prospect of coming into force any time soon. If nuclear weapons are developed, resumed nuclear testing cannot be ruled out;
Four, the 3 Nuclear Weapon States, outside the NPT, are also proceeding with the development and deployment of nuclear weapons systems;
Five, a fourth State having left the NPT, has demonstrated its nuclear explosives capability;
Six, in this climate of eroding consensus, over 20 States possess technological capability to develop nuclear weapons within weeks or a few months;
Seven, other states have recently expressed new interest in nuclear technology. Some nuclear programmes of NPT States Parties are viewed with concern and suspicion;
Eight, large stockpiles of fissile material exist in varying degrees of State control in many countries, including NWS and the three ex-NPT States and NPT Parties;
Nine, there is growing fear that non-state actors and terrorist organizations may develop the organizational skills to steal, if not produce, fissile materials for use in a "dirty bomb";
Ten, the discriminatory application of non-proliferation norms, eroding the diminishing commitment by States to these norms;
Eleven, the demonstrated failure of coercion (and even military intervention) as a tool to counter proliferation;
Twelve, the failure to take account of the underlying security preoccupation of States has propelled proliferation;
Thirteen, the accentuation of the asymmetries between the major powers and smaller States (e.g. through (i) development of ABM systems at tactical, theatre and, soon at the strategic level; (ii) steady militarization of Outer Space often in the guise of peaceful development; in fact space technologies are being integrated into strategic doctrines; and (iii) build-up of conventional forces by major powers) has reduced the disincentives against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and increased the incentives for threatened States to acquire nuclear or other WMD capabilities.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.