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Mr. Chairman,
IIOur warm felicitations to you and other members of the Bureau accompany the
confidence that your extensive skills and experience will provide a befitting
closure to our deliberations. You can count on this delegation’s full support
and cooperation. May I also register our deep appreciation for the contribution
of your distinguished predecessor to our work last year.
Mr. Chairman,
2. The decade succeeding the Cold War witnessed a remarkable surge in the
globalization of the world economy. It also, distressfully, saw a significant
retreat from the principle of equal and collective security as enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations. Accordingly, two contrasting trends define our
endeavours today. Economic integration on the one hand, and fragmentation of
security on the other. While the impact of the former on human well-being so far
remains mixed, the verdict on the latter is out and is unequivocal.
International security must be truly that: security for all underpinned by a
global architecture founded on cooperation and concord. The impulse for the
accumulation and brandishing of power to create asymetrical security equations,
regionally or globally, is intrinsically subversive of peace and has been
rejected, time and again, in the ebb and flow of history. Only that security
structure will endure and engender peace which flows from the UN Charter,
adheres to its principles, is consistent with its objectives and respectful of
its decisions.
3. The horrors of war had triggered the vision of a world body acting as the
custodian of international peace and security. Retrenchment of this role would
be fraught with irreversible and incalculable consequences. Interstate relations
must, therefore, return to the fold of the Charter. Disputes and differences
should be resolved peacefully and within the framework of the United Nations.
Use of force, except strictly in self-defence, is fundamentally repugnant to the
Charter.
4. The threat of force looms larger than ever in South Asia, which has been
described as the most dangerous place on earth. The situation in this volatile
region emphatically illustrates the inadmissible preference for war over
diplomacy. Nearly a million troops have been deployed along our borders and the
Line of Control in Kashmir with just one objective: to force Pakistan to back
away from the principled position that disputes between India and Pakistan
should be resolved through the application of the UN Charter and not the use of
force. The rejection of this legitimate demand has been accompanied by naked
threats of military action and pre-emptive strikes. Is it not a monumental irony
that aggression is being threatened against a country for urging the
implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Kashmir.
5. Irresponsible sabre rattling and threats of aggression should now stop and
make way for dialogue for the settlement of the core dispute of Jammu and
Kashmir and other outstanding issues. Continued repression of the Kashmiri
people and the organization of electoral charades do not provide the basis for
durable peace in South Asia. Reckless build-up of conventional and strategic
weapons to underpin the provenly flawed policy of aggrandizement, negates the
aspirations of the people of South Asia including the billion citizens of India
itself. Military adventurism fueled by the misplaced and unachieveable illusion
of supremacy has already brought our region to the edge of catastrophe. In his
latest report on the Work of the Organization, the Secretary General of the
United Nations has stated:
“I have consistently appealed to the parties to resume their bilateral dialogue
and to resolve their differences, over Kashmir in particular, by peaceful means.
I encourage both sides to reduce their military contingents stationed in
Kashmir, and to consider other measures and initiatives aimed at further
reducing tensions. My own good offices remain available to both sides to promote
a peaceful solution.”
Mr. Chairman,
6. India’s response to these thoughtful words would determine the fate of South
Asia. Would it become a land of peace and progress or continue in its lamentable
course of confrontation, backwardness and misery?
7. The nuclearization of the region also warrants the creation of a new security
structure founded on dialogue, peace, arms control and cooperation. Accordingly,
Pakistan has proposed the establishment of a Strategic Restraint Regime in South
Asia, encompassing the following principles:
One: India and Pakistan should formalize their respective unilateral nuclear
test moratoriums, perhaps through a bilateral treaty;
Two: Not operationally weaponize nuclear capable missile systems;
Three: Not operationally deploy nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and to keep
them on de-alert;
Four: Formalize the previous understanding to provide prior and adequate
notification of flight tests of missiles;
Five: Observe a moratorium on the acquisition, deployment or development of
Anti-Ballistic Missile systems;
Six: implement further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce
the risk of the use of nuclear weapons by miscalculation or accident;
Seven: Open discussions on the nuclear security doctrines of the two countries
with a view to forestalling an all out nuclear arms race;
Eight: An agreement on non-use of force, including the non-use of nuclear
weapons.
Nine: Conventional arms balance and a political mechanism for the resolution of
disputes, particularly Kashmir.
8. We are ready to pursue these proposals in a bilateral dialogue, under UN
auspices or through third party mediation.
Mr. Chairman,
9. At the global level, the arms control and disarmament agenda has,
regrettably, achieved neither its potential nor its promise. In our view, the
long-standing objective of general and complete disarmament under strong and
effective international control, as stipulated in the Final Document of SSOD-I,
remains relevant as ever, and should be pursued with the greatest vigour. The
following steps are of fundamental importance:
One: The existing huge nuclear inventories be attenuated substantially. The
Moscow Treaty constitutes a salutary first step in this direction in that it
reduces the imminent threat posed by deployed nuclear weapons. However, the long
term threat remains undiminished. Real threat reduction requires destruction of
nuclear weapons, which we hope would eventually happen to be followed by general
and complete disarmament.
Two: The NPT nuclear-weapon States are “unequivocally” committed to the
elimination of nuclear weapons. This commitment needs to be operationalized.
Negotiations should commence on Nuclear Disarmament at the earliest in the
Conference on Disarmament.
Three: Adequate measures in the form of a multilaterally negotiated legal
instrument will be necessary to prevent an arms race in outer space. Missile
Defences create the Sisyphean dilemma of plunging the world into another costly
and destabilizing arms race. Sustainable security cannot be achieved in the
midst of an interminable arms race.
Four: Multilateral negotiations must convene to conclude a legally-binding
international instrument on negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon
states in accordance with the UN resolutions. Such an instrument would provide
credible guarantees against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Five: Regional approaches to international security and disarmament must be
strengthened, especially in tension-ridden regions such as the Middle East and
South Asia. Every region has its sui generis dynamics. Nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation require effective redressal of security imbalances at the
regional level. In accordance with its traditional resolution on Regional
Disarmament, Pakistan has proposed this item for inclusion in the Agenda of the
Conference on Disarmament. Only one delegation demurred.
10. Other steps should include: a) commitment to the CTBT and, pending its entry
into force, continued observance of unilateral moratoriums by the nuclear-weapon
states; b) conclusion of a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable Fissile
Materials Treaty; c) full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; d)
removal of artificial hindrances to the promotion of peaceful applications of
nuclear technology.
11. At the same time, Member States should strengthen their domestic and export
controls on sensitive materials, equipment and technologies in accordance with
their obligations under relevant international legal instruments. Pakistan,
being a party to both the BWC and the CWC, and a State with nuclear capability,
is fully conscious of its responsibilities. A National Command Authority, under
the Chairmanship of the Head of Government and including three Federal Ministers
and Chiefs of Armed Services, has been set up to provide policy direction,
supervise the deployment and employment of assets and approve measures to ensure
custodial safety and complete institutional control. We will continue to
strengthen our controls as required.
12. Axiomatically, cooperative security at the global, regional and sub-regional
levels cannot be achieved unilaterally. Indeed, the multilateral approach offers
the best hope. It is unfortunate that the Conference on Disarmament remains
mired in an impasse. It must develop a balanced programme of work which answers
to the concerns of all parties.
Mr. Chairman,
13. The international community also needs to address the issue of missiles in a
cooperative spirit. We appreciate the work done by the Panel of Governmental
Experts on Missiles, set up by the Secretary General last year. For
understandable reasons, their Report remained inconclusive.
14. We favour the elaboration of a global treaty on missiles as part of a
comprehensive disarmament programme. Accordingly, we have proposed the item of
“Missiles in all aspects” for inclusion in the Agenda of the Conference on
Disarmament. A global treaty will take time. We are ready to consider global
interim measures aimed at reducing missile related threats at all levels. These
could range from de-alerting nuclear weapons and missile systems to evolving
multilaterally negotiated controls over the transfer of sensitive technologies
and supplemented by alternative measures for maintaining military balance,
especially in volatile regions, and enhancing cooperation in technologies for
peaceful purposes.
Mr. Chairman,
15. We regret the fact that the Fifth BWC Review Conference last year had to be
suspended. In view of the evolving threats, particularly in the context of
bio-terrorism, this instrument should be further strengthened. To this end,
Pakistan would continue to remain engaged. The reconvened Fifth Review
Conference in November would need to agree on a balanced and meaningful
follow-up programme, encompassing both regulatory and promotional activities.
16. On the other hand, the work within the framework of the Certain Conventional
Weapons Convention (CCW) is proceeding satisfactorily. The CCW is a unique
treaty in that it strikes a balance between legitimate security requirements and
humanitarian concerns. Preservation of this balance is a pre-requisite for the
continuing success of the CCW process.
17. We also draw satisfaction from the adoption of the Programme of Action by
the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in
All Its Aspects. Notwithstanding its imperfections, it provides a good basis to
address the issue in an incremental manner. Pakistan has already adopted a
national policy in this regard which is being effectively implemented.
18. At the deliberations of the First Committee last year, Pakistan had
underscored the necessity of addressing the threats to global and regional peace
and stability from increasing sophistication of conventional weapons i.e. the
so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. As a first step, it was suggested that
the United Nations or UNIDIR be tasked with preparing a study with the
participation of governmental experts on the subject.
19. We reiterate our proposal. Dealing with this issue is necessary. Otherwise,
the escalating asymmetry in conventional force capabilities between states,
especially at the regional and sub-regional levels, will continue to abet
military adventurism. We must deal with this question on an urgent basis.
Mr. Chairman,
20. Military expenditures consumed 850 billion dollars of this Planet’s wealth
last year dwarfing, by a wide margin, the GDP of almost half the human race. New
and unique weapon systems are being developed or procured. The multilateral
disarmament machinery is virtually out of business. Has global security been
enhanced by these trends? The answer clearly is in the negative. Unequal and
fragmented security breeds more insecurity, spawns fear and military expense
while causing deprivation to the very people who are sought to be protected.
Serious and earnest collective efforts need to be initiated to retrieve the
enfeebling commitment to multilateralism and the principle of universal and
equal security lest, in the course of time, we find ourselves on the wrong side
of history.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.