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Mr. Chairman,
I congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First
Committee at this important 60th session of the General Assembly.
2. I also take this opportunity to commend Ambassador Alfonso de Alba for his
effective leadership of this Committee in the last session.
3. We associate ourselves with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
4. In my statement, I will touch on three cross-cutting themes: (a) the global
security environment; (b) regional security; and (c) institutional challenges.
Global Security Environment
Mr. Chairman,
5. The global security architecture is in a state of flux. There are clear
differences of perspective, approach and modalities among member states to deal
with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
6. We cannot gloss over the fact that negotiations on these issues broke down
for the 2005 Summit Outcome, leaving “empty spaces” in the outcome document. The
consensus underpinning disarmament and non-proliferation has eroded and the
multilateral disarmament machinery has been severely weakened. This opens the
way for unilateral or discriminatory and coercive approaches.
7. The failure to achieve agreement at the Summit on disarmament and
non-proliferation reflects the deep differences among Member States and is
dangerous for peace and stability, especially in regions of tension. It was
against this backdrop that President General Pervez Musharraf in his address to
the UN General Assembly on September 14 said: “We must evolve a new consensus to
achieve disarmament and non-proliferation”. This must be promoted through
consultations and agreement among all UN member states, not just some self
selected, even if well-meaning group of countries.
8. In building such a consensus, we cannot but start from the basic premise in
the UN Charter that “security” is the right of every State. The Declaration of
SSOD-I adopted the principle of “equal security” for all States. In our
interdependent world, such security can be best promoted collectively, i.e.
multilaterally, not through national means, or within restricted groups, no
matter how powerful.
9. To promote genuine disarmament and non-proliferation, we must address the
motives which drive States to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These motives
include perceived threats from superior conventional or non-conventional forces;
the existence of disputes and conflicts with more powerful States; and from
discrimination in the application of international norms and laws.
10. Of course, WMD proliferation is dangerous. It can multiply the threat of the
possible use of such Weapons of Mass Destruction. But the proliferation can be
contained only if it is accompanied by a parallel effort to realize WMD
disarmament. Discrimination and asymmetric possession of WMD is not a recipe for
non-proliferation or regional or global stability. Nor are technology
constraints a durable answer unless the motives for proliferation are addressed.
11. We must, of course, address the new threat of terrorists acquiring WMD.
Again, this can succeed only through collective and cooperative measures, not
through coercion and discrimination.
12. And, new threats cannot blind us to the danger posed by the existence and
continuous improvement i.e. vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation must be promoted and pursued simultaneously;
they are two sides of the same coin.
13. A new security consensus should take into account the need to address
existing and emerging global challenges to regional and international security.
This goal can be achieved through the Conference on Disarmament or a special
session of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC).
14. Such a new consensus would help address such threats as WMD proliferation to
terrorists, vertical nuclear proliferation, the development and accumulation of
advanced conventional weapons, development and deployment of ABM system, the
absence of an international agreement on missiles and the militarization of the
outer space.
15. In the area of nuclear disarmament, credible steps by nuclear weapon states
within a reasonable time frame are essential to revalidate the “bargain” on
disarmament and non-proliferation and restore a genuine balance between them.
Secondly, cooperation in the peaceful use of energy must continue to enjoy
international support under globally agreed conditions. Thirdly, there is need
to reconcile nuclear reality within the global non-proliferation regime i.e. the
existence of 8, not 5, nuclear weapons States.
16. Although Pakistan subscribes to the objectives of the NPT it is a nuclear
weapon state. We are already fulfilling the NPT’s non-proliferation norms.
Pakistan is prepared to continue to act in consonance with the obligations,
undertaken by nuclear weapon states, under Article I, II and III of the NPT.
But, we cannot be expected to adhere to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.
We are observing a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests. IAEA Director
General Mohammed El-Baradei has called for the inclusion of the three non-NPT
nuclear states in future talks on disarmament and non-proliferation. Such calls
should be heeded. Universality is a noble objective but it must respect existing
realities.
17. Pakistan supports negotiations on a fissile material treaty (FMT) in
accordance with the Shannon Mandate and the A-5 proposal for a universal,
non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable
treaty. The report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) clearly identifies the
key issues which include a) scope of the treaty, b) past and future production
of fissile material and c) management of such material. The agreed basis for
negotiating the Treaty cannot be described as “pre conditions”.
18. Nor are prospects for a moratorium on fissile material production realistic.
In any event, a non-verifiable moratorium will neither enhance confidence nor
advance the objective of a comprehensive verifiable fissile material treaty.
Pakistan will halt fissile material production consistent with the requirements
of its nuclear deterrence posture.
19. Unless nuclear disarmament is achieved, non-nuclear weapon states will
continue to be entitled to assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used
against them. The security assurances offered by most nuclear weapons states are
restrictive, partial and qualified. Threats to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear states in certain circumstances must be disavowed. What will enhance
the security of the non-nuclear weapon state are universal, unconditional and
legally binding assurances.
20. We share the view that the existing international legal instruments are
inadequate to prevent weaponization of outer space. There is a need to
consolidate and reinforce the regime and enhance its effectiveness even as we
comply strictly with existing agreements. China and Russia, in this regard, have
done important work. We, therefore, support the A-5 proposal to commence work on
PAROS in a CD Ad Hoc Committee.
21. We share the global concern regarding unbridled ballistic missile
proliferation. To avert it, we call for enhanced efforts to conclude a
comprehensive, non-discriminatory and universally negotiated treaty within the
United Nations system on missiles covering all aspects.
22. The chemical weapons prohibition regime, overseen by OPCW, is a
manifestation of the success of multilateralism. However, we must speed up the
destruction of declared chemical weapons and address related environmental and
safety concerns.
23. On the BTWC, we should look forward to 2006 Review Conference and beyond to
make renewed efforts to build a regime that can ensure compliance and
verification by all Member States.
Pakistan’s security policy
24. Pakistan’s strategic programme is security driven, not status driven.
Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons only after nuclear proliferation had happened
in South Asia. The sole purpose of our capability is to deter all forms of
external aggression that can endanger our national security. Our strategic
posture reflects restraint and responsibility. We maintain a credible minimum
nuclear deterrence. Pakistan will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear weapon states. We are against an open-ended nuclear or
conventional arms race in South Asia.
25. Pakistan has taken a series of measures to ensure responsible stewardship of
our nuclear programme:
(a) In 2000, we created a National Command Authority with a strong
military-civilian interface, which oversees and manages our strategic assets and
nuclear programme.
(b) A reliable control and command system has been established;
(c) Custodial controls have been streamlined and strengthened to guard against
risks of leakage of technology, accidental launch or unauthorized deployment.
Oversight is stringent.
(d) We have passed and enforced laws to strengthen export controls on nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons. Last year, we enacted a comprehensive Export
Control Act to deal with nuclear and biological weapons which tightens controls
over export, re-export, trans-shipment and transit of sensitive goods,
technologies and equipments. We are working on a separate new law on the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
(e) Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) ensures safe operation of
civilian nuclear plants.
Regional Security
26. Resolute efforts should be made to defuse regional tensions and resolve
conflicts in the Middle East. Pakistan supports the fulfillment of international
obligations by all states and the objective of creating a Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone in the Middle East.
27. All states must observe their treaty obligations. Pakistan is opposed to
nuclear proliferation. However, every country has the right to develop
technology for peaceful purposes. Pakistan is opposed to the use of force which
would further destabilize an already volatile region.
28. We welcome the progress achieved at the Six-Party Talks aimed at ensuring a
Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons as well as addressing the security
concerns of all concerned states in North East Asia.
29. In South Asia, Pakistan seeks to promote a Strategic Restraint Regime with
India which has three constituents: (a) conflict resolution; (b) nuclear and
missile restraint; and (c) conventional balance.
30. Since early 2003, we have sustained a multi-track engagement with India
encompassing confidence building measures and a composite dialogue. President
Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in their meeting here in New
York on 14 September, reiterated their commitment to ensure a peaceful
settlement of all pending issues including Jammu and Kashmir; and agreed that
possible options for a peacefully negotiated settlement should continue to be
pursued in a sincere spirit and a purposeful manner.
31. Since June 2004, Pakistan and India have held three rounds of consultations
to elaborate nuclear and conventional CBMs. Both countries have affirmed that
their respective nuclear capabilities, based on national security imperatives,
constituted a factor of stability. We are working on strategic stability,
confidence building, and risk reduction. Two days ago, on October 3, Pakistan
and India signed an agreement on advance notification of ballistic missile
tests, during the Indian External Affairs Minister’s visit to Islamabad.
32. As part of the Strategic Restraint Regime we have also made the following
proposals:
- Continuation of the moratorium on further nuclear tests.
- Maintenance of nuclear weapons on de-alert status.
- No operational deployment of anti-ballistic missiles.
- No acquisition or deployment of anti-ballistic system.
33. In South Asia we need a stable balance of conventional forces to ensure
strategic stability between Pakistan and India. Massive induction of
sophisticated weaponry including combat aircraft, aircraft carriers, airborne
early warning and control system, missile defense, nuclear sub-marines and war
ships will accentuate conventional asymmetries and compel greater reliance on
nuclear and missile deterrence. There must be restraint both in the demand and
the supply on conventional weapons in South Asia. We agree with Undersecretary
Nabouyasu Abe that the preponderant focus on the WMD threat should not lessen
our attention to the matters relating to regulation and reduction of
conventional arms and armed forces.
34. The entire international community has an interest in ensuring strategic
stability in South Asia at the lowest possible level and not to accelerate an
arms race in the region. Discriminatory approaches in the nuclear or
conventional fields will not advance stability in South Asia. In the strategic
and defence areas, Pakistan always demands and deserves parity of treatment with
our neighbour.
Institutional deficit
35. The international community must seek to repair the erosion in the ability
of its disarmament machinery to promote disarmament and non-proliferation. The
First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament as well as the UN Disarmament
Commission, among others, provide the internationally agreed multilateral forums
to address issues of non-proliferation and disarmament. New initiatives that
bypass the existing multilateral framework offer only temporary solutions for
counter-proliferation, non-proliferation and non-compliance. An unequal and
restricted Security Council cannot supplant or circumvent multilateral
negotiating processes. Unilateral restrictions and selective regimes will not
promote security; they will exacerbate insecurity. Elaboration of treaty regimes
is no doubt an arduous exercise, but once treaties have been agreed freely they
have a better chance of commanding adherence and compliance.
36. We agree with Secretary General Kofi Annan that “we must revitalize our
multilateral frameworks … to address the growing risks of a cascade of
proliferation….” Multilateral norms and instruments enjoy universal legality and
acceptance. Decisions taken in exclusive or “non-institutionalized multilateral
forums” will not have legitimacy in the long run. We must, therefore, reaffirm
our strong commitment to multilateralism and multilateral approaches.”
37. One definite way to move forward is to activate the CD by breaking its
chronic and by now unsustainable impasse. The deadlock in the CD is political,
not procedural. Therefore, it cannot be broken by semantic or clever proposals
for a programme of work. What we need is the political will to engage in
substantive negotiations on all issues; not a “quick fix” to address only some
of them.
Mr. Chairman,
38. This is a moment for reflection. We must not just lament on our past and
recent failures, but look to the future with the vision required to realize the
goals of disarmament, non-proliferation in ways that enhance the security of all
States and thus promote global peace and security.
39. As the steward of this important Committee, you have a unique opportunity,
Mr. Chairman, to evolve a new synthesis, a new consensus. During this very
session, you could hold informal consultations to map out a collective future
strategy. We assure you of our full support in such an endeavor.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.