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Mr. Chairman,
In my intervention, I will touch on the subjects of conventional weapons, CCW,
ERW, mines other than anti-personnel mines, and small arms and light weapons.
Conventional Arms
At the beginning of the First Committee session, Undersecretary Nabouyasu Abe
cautioned us that the preponderant focus on the WMD threat should not lessen our
attention to the matters relating to regulation and reduction of conventional
arms and armed forces. We agree.
But this is precisely what is happening. Conventional weapons and armaments and
the global trade in them are becoming something of a blind spot of the
international community.
While international attention is focused on the need to control weapons of mass
destruction, and rightly so, the trade in conventional weapons continues to
flourish in a legal and moral vacuum. After an initial decline in the outlays on
conventional weapons in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, in the recent
years we have seen a surge in expenditures and a build up of conventional
armaments and armed forces.
Conventional weapons are used in scores of conflicts raging in different parts
of the world. Conventional arms include small arms and light weapons, which no
doubt have a destabilizing impact. However, overemphasis on small and light
weapons and a disproportionate focus on them tend to eclipse the salience of
sophisticated conventional weapons and technology being traded in huge
quantities around the globe.
The Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly on
Disarmament (SSOD I) characterized the global military expenditure in 1978 as a
“colossal waste of resources” and called for not only reduction in such
spending, but for the reinvestment of resources into efforts to fight poverty
and improve human conditions.
By that yardstick, cumulatively, global trends in military expenditures
worldwide are both staggering and alarming. In 2004, the total military spending
rose to $ 1.035 trillion, at current prices. The total budget of the United
Nations, mandated to maintain international peace and security, is less than 1.5
% of world’s military expenditure.
The total value of arms transfer agreements in 2004 has been estimated at $ 37
billion, a significant increase over 2003.
In 2004, the value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations was
nearly $ 21.8 billion, an increase over $ 15. 1 billion total in 2003.
The total value of international arms transfer agreements, during the period
2001 to 2004, was $ 131. 2 billion. During this period, developing countries
accounted for 63.2 % of all international arms deliveries.
The third world countries are the “favored” destination for arms sales. New
markets are being explored, created and sought after.
Globalized arms production and sales ignore the grave humanitarian, political
and strategic consequences of conventional weapons proliferation.
Arms sellers often encourage both sides in a conflict to buy more weapons. The
only question asked is who has the money. The result is a series of regional
arms races mostly in volatile parts of the world. In fact, arms vendors from
different countries compete for a bigger slice of a country’s growing defense
budget and propel it. Some of them see conflict situations as a “unique selling
opportunity”. While trying to facilitate talks to ease tensions, senior
officials of the selling nations have used such occasions to lobby for sale of
sophisticated military equipment produced by their national manufacturers. These
officials market their weapons, even as they seek to mediate peace.
On the other hand, the demand for weapons emanates from either insecurity or
ambition. Some states are seeking to build up their national armed forces on
land, in the air, and at the sea, with the declared objective of emerging as a
global power, often with the self-proclaimed intent to dominate their own
region. Other states affected by the imbalance are then obliged to acquire
weapons to ensure a minimum capability to deter aggression and domination. The
build up of such massive arms acquisitions not only diverts resources from the
desperate requirements of development and poverty alleviation, but also
contributes to instability and insecurity at the regional and global levels.
In view of these disturbing trends, it is imperative that we pursue conventional
arms control, at the lowest possible levels of armaments and military forces, in
order to promote regional and international peace and security. We believe that
the preservation of a balance in the defense capabilities of states at the
lowest levels or armaments should be the prime objective of conventional arms
control
I would like to recall the definitive and authoritative direction given by SSOD-I:
“Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should
be carried out on the balanced reduction of forces and of conventional
armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a
view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into
account the need of all states to protect their security”.
Conventional arms control needs to be pursued primarily in the regional and
subregional contexts since most threats to peace and security arise mainly in
states located in the same region or sub-region.
In this regard, we can adapt and follow good practices. The value of the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, a cornerstone of European security,
cannot be underestimated. States with larger military capabilities have a
special responsibility in promoting such agreements for regional security.
We must step up efforts to curb excessive and destabilizing accumulation of
conventional weapons as well as their uncontrolled transfers.
Conventional arms control must (a) address the root causes of insecurity,
emanating from disputes, conflicts and threat perceptions and (b) seek to
promote balance among regional states. We need to follow up such affirmations
with concrete action:
Firstly, the Department of Disarmament Affairs can analyze the data on arms
transfers and help states develop benchmarks for conventional arms control at
regional and subregional levels.
In 2002, at the tenth anniversary of the UN Arms Register, Secretary General
Kofi Annan said that “if the effectiveness of this tool is strengthened further,
it can serve as a significant early-warning mechanism, contributing with other
instruments to the prevention of conflict and to restraint in arms acquisition”.
This assessment remains valid.
Secondly, the Conference on Disarmament can consider formulation of the
principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional
arms control.
A stable balance of conventional forces is necessary to ensure strategic
stability, particularly in the regions riven with tensions. Massive induction of
sophisticated weaponry accentuates conventional asymmetries and compels greater
reliance on nuclear and missile deterrence in the regions that have such
capabilities.
In South Asia, we are pursuing a Strategic Restraint Regime, which has three
constituents: nuclear and missile restraint; conventional balance; and conflict
resolution. Even as we sustain confidence building and composite dialogue to
address outstanding issues and work towards strategic stability and nuclear risk
reduction, we will continue to strive for a conventional balance at the lowest
possible level of armaments. In the interest of peace and security in South
Asia, there must be restraint both in the demand and the supply of conventional
weapons.
CCW
Pakistan is fully committed to the faithful implementation of the Convention on
Certain Weapons and the protocols added to it. The delicate balance in these
instruments – to minimize the human suffering without sacrificing the legitimate
security interests of states – must be maintained.
ERW
The Protocol on the Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), though not perfect, is a
significant step in the field of international humanitarian law (IHL). Its real
value will be judged by its faithful implementation. Therefore, instead of
discussing its further refinements or modifications, the focus should be on the
Protocol’s entry into force and implementation. Pakistan’s armed forces are
being trained and sensitized at all levels to the IHL principles of humanity,
discrimination, proportionality, and superfluous injury. Legal advisers are
associated with the planning at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
MOTAPM/AVMs
This August, extensive discussions on anti-vehicle mines were held by the Group
of Government Experts (GGE). Divergences remain. We are of the view that the CCW
and its five protocols adequately address humanitarian aspects of mines,
including AVMs. AVM are defensive weapons meant to deter aggression and to avert
war. Thus, they can contribute to stability in a conflict situation. In our
case, empirical evidence gathered over the past fifty five years has established
that AVMs have not caused civilian or military casualties. Further discussions
on MOTAPM should focus on the questions of varied requirements, national
capacities, and illicit transfers to non-state actors. We banned export of mines
in 1999.
SALW
The UN Programme of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons has worked out
a balance between humanitarian concerns and the legitimate security needs of
States and rightly focuses on the “illicit trade”. This balance and focus must
be maintained.
Member States have achieved considerable progress in implementing the PoA
nationally, regionally and at international levels. The recent conclusion of the
Marking and Tracing Instrument was an important step forward in furthering the
objectives of UNPoA. The next important issue is illicit brokering which should
be taken up by a Group of Governmental Experts in pursuance of the UNGA
resolution.
We look forward to actively participating in the next year’s Review Conference,
which we hope will maintain the spirit of consensus that has characterized the
discussions and negotiations on various aspects of the small arms and light
weapons
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.