|
|
Mr. Chairman,
The Pakistan delegation congratulates you on your election as the chairman of
the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission this year. My delegation
also extends felicitations to the members of the Commission’s Bureau on their
election and to the chairs of the two Working Groups. We assure you of our
support and cooperation.
2. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome the new Under-Secretary
General for Disarmament Affairs, Ambassador Nobuaki Tanaka. We wish him success
as he assumes new responsibilities.
Mr. Chairman,
3. The UNDC session has two items on its agenda – a) recommendations for
achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons and b) practical confidence-building measures in the field of
conventional weapons. In addition to these two agenda items, the Commission
shall also discuss “measures for improving the effectiveness of the methods of
work of the Commission”. We hope the Commission would be able to overcome the
differences surrounding the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda and agree
on actions required at the international and regional levels with a view to
reviving prospects for effective nuclear and conventional disarmament and its
meaningful contribution to international and regional peace and security.
4. With regard to agenda item one, the Commission should be able to recommend
ways and means of addressing the motives which drive States to acquire weapons
of mass destruction. These motives include perceived threats from superior
conventional or non-conventional forces; the existence of disputes and conflicts
with more powerful States; and from discrimination in the application of
international norms and laws.
5. The new threat of terrorists acquiring WMD must also be addressed. The threat
of proliferation can be contained only if it is accompanied by a parallel effort
to realize WMD disarmament. Discrimination and asymmetric possession of WMD is
not a recipe for non-proliferation or regional or global stability. To deal with
this threat effectively, collective and cooperative measures, not coercion and
discrimination will yield success. At the same time, new threats should not
obscure the dangers posed by the existence and continuous improvement i.e.
vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin and must be promoted and
pursued simultaneously.
Mr. Chairman,
6. Iinitiatives that bypass the existing multilateral framework offer only
temporary solutions for counter-proliferation, non-proliferation and
non-compliance. An unequal and restricted Security Council cannot supplant or
circumvent multilateral negotiating processes. Unilateral restrictions and
selective regimes will not promote security; they will exacerbate insecurity.
7. Elaboration of treaty regimes is no doubt an arduous exercise, but once
treaties have been agreed freely, they have a better chance of commanding
adherence and compliance. It is therefore important that the mandate of the
Security Council 1540 Committee should now be transferred to a more
representative and legitimate body within the UN General Assembly.
8. In the area of nuclear disarmament, credible steps by nuclear weapon states
within a reasonable time frame are essential to revalidate the “bargain” on
disarmament and non-proliferation and restore a genuine balance between them.
Cooperation in the peaceful use of energy must also continue to enjoy
international support under globally agreed conditions. There is need to
reconcile nuclear reality within the global non-proliferation regime i.e. the
existence of 8, not 5, nuclear weapons States. This needs to be achieved on a
systemic and non-discriminatory basis that strengthens rather than weakens the
objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Discriminatory
approaches and double standards will not serve these objectives.
9. Although Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state, it subscribes to the objectives
of the NPT. We are fulfilling the NPT’s non-proliferation norms and objectives.
Pakistan is prepared on a voluntary and non-discriminatory basis to continue to
act in consonance with the obligations, undertaken by nuclear weapon states,
under Article I, II and III of the NPT. Efforts to secure the universality of
the NPT are commendable but they must take account of realties that are unlikely
to change in the foreseeable future.
Mr. Chairman,
10. Pakistan supports negotiations on a fissile material treaty (FMT) in
accordance with the Shannon Mandate and the A-5 proposal for a universal,
non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable
treaty. The report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) clearly identifies the
key issues which include a) scope of the treaty, b) past and future production
of fissile material and c) management of such material. The agreed basis for
negotiating the Treaty cannot be described as “pre conditions”.
11. Unless nuclear disarmament is achieved, non-nuclear weapon states will
continue to be entitled to assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used
against them. The security assurances offered by most nuclear weapons states are
restrictive, partial and qualified and do not enhance the security of the
non-nuclear weapon state. Threats to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
states in certain circumstances must be disavowed.
12. We share the view that the existing international legal instruments are
inadequate to prevent weaponization of outer space. There is a need to
consolidate and reinforce the regime and enhance its effectiveness even as we
comply strictly with existing agreements. China and Russia, in this regard, have
done important work. We, therefore, support the A-5 proposal to commence work on
PAROS in a CD Ad Hoc Committee.
13. We also share the global concern regarding unbridled ballistic missile
proliferation. To avert it, we call for enhanced efforts to conclude a
comprehensive, non-discriminatory and universally negotiated treaty within the
United Nations system on missiles covering all aspects.
Mr. Chairman,
14. While international attention is focused on the need to control weapons of
mass destruction, the trade and military expenditures in conventional weapons
continue to rise. After an initial decline in the outlays on conventional
weapons in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, in the recent years there is
a surge in expenditures and a build up of conventional armaments and armed
forces.
15. The Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly on
Disarmament (SSOD I) characterized the global military expenditure in 1978 as a
"colossal waste of resources" and called for not only reduction in such
spending, but for the reinvestment of such resources into efforts to fight
poverty and improve human condition.
16. By that yardstick, cumulatively, global trends in military expenditures
worldwide are both staggering and alarming. In 2004, the total military spending
rose to $ 1.035 trillion, at 2005 prices. This is in sharp contrast to the total
budget of the United Nations, mandated to maintain international peace and
security, which is less than 1.5 % of world's military expenditure. The total
value of arms transfer agreements in 2004 has been estimated at $ 37 billion, a
significant increase over 2003. In 2004, the value of all arms transfer
agreements with developing nations was nearly $ 21.8 billion - an increase of $
15. 1 billion compared to 2003.
17. The total value of international arms transfer agreements, during the period
2001 to 2004, was $ 131. 2 billion. During this period, developing countries
accounted for 63.2 % of all international arms deliveries. Globalized arms
production and sales continue to ignore the grave humanitarian, political and
strategic consequences of conventional weapons proliferation.
Mr. Chairman,
18. In view of these disturbing trends, it is imperative to pursue conventional
arms control, at the lowest possible levels of armaments and military forces, in
order to promote regional and international peace and security. We believe that
the preservation of a balance in the defense capabilities of states at the
lowest levels of armaments should be the prime objective of conventional arms
control.
19. Conventional arms control needs to be pursued primarily in the regional and
subregional contexts since most threats to peace and security arise mainly in
states located in the same region or subregion. In this regard, we can adapt and
follow good practices. The value of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe, a cornerstone of European security, cannot be underestimated. States
with larger military capabilities have a special responsibility in promoting
such agreements for regional security.
20. The General Assembly has passed a resolution entitled "Conventional arms
control at the regional and sub-regional levels" which requests the Conference
on Disarmament to consider formulating the principles that can serve as a
framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control. The General
Assembly has also adopted a resolution tilted “Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
in the Regional and Sub-regional context”. This resolution emphasizes that the
objective of CBMs should be to help strengthen international peace and security
and be consistent with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest
level of armaments. It also encourages the promotion of bilateral and regional
CBMs to avoid conflict and prevent unintended and accidental outbreak of
hostilities. We hope that the Commission could draw on these resolutions in
preparing recommendations on CBMs in the field of conventional weapons.
21. In South Asia, we are pursuing a Strategic Restraint Regime, which has three
constituents: nuclear and missile restraint; conventional balance; and conflict
resolution. Even as we pursue the composite dialogue and confidence-building
measures to resolve outstanding issues and promote strategic stability and
nuclear risk reduction, we will continue to strive for a conventional balance at
the lowest possible level of armaments since an imbalance could threaten
stability, both conventional and non-conventional. In the interest of peace and
security in South Asia, there must be restraint both in the demand and the
supply of conventional weapons.
Mr. Chairman,
22. This session is taking place in the backdrop of several challenges – both to
the disarmament and non-proliferation regime as well as to its multilateral
deliberative and negotiating platforms. The failure to achieve agreement on
disarmament and non-proliferation at the September Summit last year highlighted
these divergences. A decade long impasse at the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva and the deadlock for two years within this Commission underscore the fact
that there are clear differences of perspective, approach and modalities among
member states to deal with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues.
23. These differences are dangerous for peace and stability, particularly in
regions riven by conflicts and tensions. It is therefore essential to promote,
through consultations and agreement among all UN member states, a new security
consensus to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation. It must be premised on
one of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter that “security” is the right
of every State.
24. The following elements could constitute the basis for such a consensus:
a) Affirmation of the centrality of UN Charter for peaceful resolution of
underlying disputes and acceptance of the principle of “equal security” for all
States;
b) Adherence to principles and purposes of UN Charter to advance disarmament and
non-proliferation and to promote and preserve international and regional peace
and security;
c) Initial steps towards disarmament including those agreed at the international
level; De-alert nuclear weapons;
d) Compliance by all States Parties to their respective obligations towards WMD
disarmament and non- proliferation;
e) Normalization of the relationship of the three non-NPT States with the NPT
regime (as suggested by Dr. al-Baradei and others);
f) Commitment by all States to implement agreed measures to prevent terrorists
from acquiring WMDs and their means of delivery;
g) Reaffirmation that preventing the proliferation of WMDs shall not hamper
international cooperation for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful uses
should not be used as a cover for proliferation;
h) Progress towards conventional weapons control and non-proliferation,
specially in regions of conflict with a view to promoting the maintenance of
security at the lowest possible level of armaments;
i) Full implementation of the UN Programme of Action on SALW;
j) Revitalization of the UN disarmament machinery, specially the Conference on
Disarmament (CD), the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the First Committee
to address the international security, disarmament and proliferation challenges;
25. A new consensus would help address such threats as WMD proliferation to
terrorists, the reported new war fighting nuclear doctrines and the accompanying
design and development of the useable nuclear weapons, the development and
accumulation of advanced conventional weapons, development and deployment of ABM
system globally and regionally, the absence of an international agreement on
missiles and the militarization of the outer space.
Mr. Chairman,
26. With regard to consideration of the issue of improving the Commission’s
working methods, we share the NAM view that this issue has to be seen and
discussed within the over-arching process of the revitalization of the General
Assembly. A balanced and comprehensive approach is essential. At the same time,
it should be noted that the deadlock in the CD or for that matter in the overall
multilateral disarmament machinery, is political, not procedural. Therefore, it
cannot be broken by semantics or clever proposals for a programme of work. What
is required is the political will to engage in substantive negotiations on all
issues; not a “quick fix” to address only some of them.
27. Pending disagreements on the CD’s programme of work and agenda, the
Commission could consider, within its three year cycle of work programme, the
possibility of convening a special session to evolve and develop a new consensus
on disarmament and non-proliferation.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.