We congratulate you on your election as Chairman of the Commission this year. We also commend the efforts of Ambassador Enrique Roman-Moray as the departing Chairman. On behalf of the Pakistan delegation, I assure you and the newly elected Bureau of our full support and cooperation.
We associate ourselves with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
We have also heard an important substantive statement from High Representative Angela Kane that will guide our deliberations.
The Commission proceedings are taking place against a turbulent global security backdrop. Old regional conflicts continue to fester, as new ones flare up. There are also signs of growing global tensions and confrontation.
This complex global political landscape has had a negative impact on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Differences on perspectives, approaches and modalities persist.
The hostile use of cyber and other emerging technologies are worrying trends.
This Commission holds immense promise to meet some of the complex contemporary challenges. The UNDC has successfully produced several useful guidelines and CBMs, which later laid the foundation for regional and global instruments. It can and should be enabled to play its deliberative role to harmonize the differences among Member States.
For several years now, Pakistan has called for evolving a new consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to reconciling the diversity in perspectives.
I outline some of the issues which this Commission could consider:
First,in evolving a new approach, we need to start from a basic premise - recognition of the right to equal security for all States. The SSOD-I adopted the principle of "equal security" for all States, in the non-conventional and conventional fields and at regional as well as international levels.
Two,we need to address the motives that drive States to acquire weapons to defend themselves. These motives include perceived threats from superior conventional or non-conventional forces; the existence of disputes and conflicts; and discrimination in the application of international norms and laws.
Three, the Nuclear Weapon States must demonstrate a renewed commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament within a reasonable timeframe.
Four,until nuclear disarmament is achieved, non-nuclear weapon states should have the assurances that they will not be threatened with the use of nuclear or even conventional weapons. The security assurances offered by nuclear weapons states need to be translated into a universal, unconditional and legally binding treaty.
Five,we must evolve a universal and non-discriminatory agreement for addressing concerns arising from development, deployment and proliferation of missiles and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems, which are inherently destabilizing. And finally,
Six,an agreed approach needs to be evolved for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under appropriate international safeguards, in accordance with the international obligations of States and on a non-discriminatory basis. The advances in technology as well as an improved IAEA inspections regime have made it possible to promote "proliferation resistant" nuclear energy. However, in building a new inspection regime, it would be vital to ensure that it is applied equitably, both to nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, in accordance with their obligations.
In the area of conventional weapons, it is essential to address the issues of their excessive production and sales, as well as their reduction in a comprehensive and balanced manner. States motivations for acquisition of arms for security needs cannot be separated from arms-production-and-sale that are driven by profit and political considerations.
It is also important to make concerted efforts for balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. As laid down in the Final Document of SSOD-I, these negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on militarily significant states. The increase in the number of conventional weapons as well as their growing sophistication have a direct causal relationship with the continuing reliance on nuclear weapons.
The recent lack of consensus on the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations reminds us of the principle of SSOD-I which enunciates that “The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage.”
Some points, from Pakistan’s policy on nuclear and conventional arms issues:
First, For its part, Pakistan has been pursuing a strategic restraint regime in South Asia comprising nuclear restraint, conventional balance, and conflict resolution. In the past several years, our focus has been on Confidence Building Measures. Only recently, Pakistan and India reviewed implementation and strengthening of existing nuclear CBMs, such as Pre-Notification of Flight Tests of Ballistic Missiles and Reducing the Risk from Accidents relating to Nuclear Weapons, and possibilities for mutually acceptable additional CBMs.
Second, Pakistan is working towards promoting conventional stability and restraint in South Asia. In the United Nations, we will continue to advocate for regional and sub-regional CBMs on conventional arms and the need for balanced reductions in conventional forces and armaments.
Third, Pakistan needs nuclear technology to meet its growing energy needs. We have therefore been urging the international community to give Pakistan access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses on a non-discriminatory basis.
Fourth, Disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes. A single-minded focus on FMCT is not a panacea. A balanced approach must be adopted towards the four core issues on the CD’s agenda. A lop-sided pursuit of FMCT from the non-proliferation prism while ignoring its disarmament imperatives, such as existing stocks, and shelving the equally, if not more, important issues, such as nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and prevention of arms race in outer space, has not worked before. Neither will it work in the future. They need to be promoted in tandem in order to promote international peace, security and stability.
Fifth, There is nothing wrong with the rules of procedure or the working methods; nor with the institutions and their membership dealing with disarmament. The same rules, methods, and institutions have, in the past, produced the CWC and CTBT, as well as guidelines on NWFZs and international arms transfers. All these achievements owe a great deal to the cardinal precept of consensus rule. What we need is due diligence for consensus not attempts to rewrite the rules of procedure. What we need is political will, especially by the major powers, to achieve the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner.
To conclude, we express our full support for the call of NAM countries to convene the Fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-IV) as a means to revive the consensus on achieving the agreed goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.