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Chairperson,
The shared quest to control, regulate and eventually reduce conventional and non-conventional arms has always required agreed and effective negotiating mechanisms. Accordingly, the most consequential and consensual architecture for negotiating conventions and treaties in the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation was finally created by the United Nations in the last century.
The UN Disarmament Machinery, as we know it, was created by the General Assembly in its First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I) thirty seven years ago. The key requirement set forth by SSOD-I in the context of this machinery is: " The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage.”
During the past few years, some of the discourse over the machinery of disarmament has focused on the following myths: a) the CD has failed to produce any treaty in many years; b) among the four core issues on the CD agenda, there is consensus on one issue; c) the working methods and rules of procedure of the CD are out-dated and need to be changed.
The primary purpose of creating the CD was Nuclear Disarmament – an agenda item on which no progress has been allowed by some major powers for the last 32 years. The leading critics of the CD are themselves responsible for dragging their feet on the most important issues of Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security Assurances, and PAROS. These countries have also played a major role in ensuring CD’s inactivity for decades and stalled deliberations in the Disarmament Commission. Their self-righteous concerns are limited to progress on a single issue in the CD, with no interest to the other three core issues on its agenda.
Chairperson,
The challenges facing the international disarmament agenda and the machinery are however not exclusive to the CD.
Let us consider the state of affairs in the First Committee. In the past ten years, several measures have been taken to rationalize and improve the methods of work of the Committee. The primary goals of these efforts were to achieve efficiency and effectiveness as also “results”. For over a decade, this Committee has pursued a more streamlined programme of work, biennialization or triennialization of resolutions, more structured thematic debates along with panellists, consolidation of reports as well as early selection of Chairs of the Committee and Bureau.
Yet, with all these efficiency-driven measures, the effectiveness, authority and results of the First Committee are obvious. These facts would suggest that the disarmament agenda and machinery insofar as the First Committee is concerned are as much at a standstill as the CD. More importantly, the changes in working methods have not led to results on substance either i.e. forward movement on the priority accorded to nuclear disarmament.
Similarly, the UNDC has not been able to agree on any recommendations and guidelines for more than a decade and half. The differences in perceptions and priorities among Member States have been so deep that the Commission has not been able, at times, to agree even on the wording of its nuclear agenda item. The Disarmament Commission has also attempted, in its own way, to improve its working methods without much success.
Surely, there is always room for more improvement but the real challenge, in our view, is how to deal with the political dynamics and developments outside the conference rooms of the United Nations.
It is therefore clear that other parts of the disarmament machinery are confronted with similar difficulties. We take this opportunity to reiterate that the problems facing the disarmament machinery are not organizational or procedural. The problems relate to the “external political environment”, which impacts on these fora. As we all know the CD and other components of the machinery do not operate in a vacuum and are affected by developments that take place outside meeting rooms.
Chairperson,
To make progress in the CD and other parts of disarmament machinery, it is essential to take into account the security concerns of all States. Recognizing and addressing these concerns is the only way to unblock the CD and revitalize the machinery. No treaty has ever been agreed nor will be, by the negotiating States unless their legitimate security concerns are accommodated.
Moreover, in the last few years, the discriminatory nuclear cooperation policies pursued by some major powers have created insecurities and imbalances. These policies, by undermining international non-proliferation norms in pursuit of power and profit, have accentuated the asymmetry in fissile material stocks in South Asia. Regrettably, these discriminatory policies continue and have found no opposition amongst the NSG members, comprised of some of the most ardent supporters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and strongest critics of the so-called “lack of progress in the CD”.
It is for these reasons that Pakistan has been obliged to take a stand against nuclear selectivity, discrimination and exceptionalism. No country can be expected to compromise on its fundamental security interests for an instrument that is cost free for all other concerned countries.
Chairperson,
Some have chosen to project ill-conceived efforts such as the establishment of a GGE on FMCT as a major step forward. Quite the contrary, such attempts only portray a false sense of progress. We wish to reiterate that such measures are contrary to the recognized international position adopted by consensus that the CD is the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament. The GGE simply duplicated the CD’s work in a non-inclusive body, without bringing any added value to this issue.
Despite claims of a consensus report, the Group failed to produce any consensus recommendation worth any substance. Major differences persist on each fundamental aspect of the proposed treaty.
As we have stated before, changing the forum or format will not overcome the fundamental obstructions. Hence, the temptation, however well meaning, to seek outside CD options for at least some, if not all the issues on the CD agenda is ill-advised. Pakistan does not support weakening of the CD’s role through UNGA led non-universal processes that are divisive and not agreed by consensus.
Chairperson,
It is a matter of some satisfaction that after several years of stalemate, the CD has agreed since 2014 on a schedule of activities involving substantive discussions on all its agenda items in a balanced and equitable manner. While not amounting to negotiations or pre-negotiations, these discussions, in our view, have proved useful in highlighting the various aspects of each of the agenda items and to further strengthen our conviction that the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate venue to hold such discussions.
Pakistan has participated actively in these discussions and made several substantive contributions including on the issue of fissile materials. In this context we put forward concrete ideas and submitted a working paper on how the issue of fissile materials stocks could be addressed in a manner that would address the security concerns of all states while at the same time making a significant contribution to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.
Notwithstanding our firm belief that the CD’s deadlock is not at all related to its working methods, Pakistan was ready to join consensus on the adoption of a decision establishing an Informal Working Group (IWG) to review the CD’s methods of work. Even as we are willing to work with other CD members to examine concrete proposals for CD’s reform, we wish to underline that simply changing the working methods, for example even by amending the consensus rule or extending the tenures of the Presidents, would not affect the national security calculus of states based on which they take the positions that they do in the CD.
Chairperson,
Pakistan strongly believes in the need for preserving all the components of the disarmament machinery that have been developed with consensus. Any effort to bypass or weaken this machinery would undermine consensus and legitimacy. Pakistan would not be part of any such efforts.
Instead of selective and partial solutions aimed at strengthening the disarmament machinery, Pakistan calls for evolving a new and balanced consensus to deal with the present stalemate in the mechanisms and modalities of promoting global peace and security as well as in advancing disarmament negotiations.
In this regard, Pakistan fully supports the long-standing call of NAM countries, which comprise almost two-third of the UN membership, to convene the Fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-IV). This session would contribute positively towards finding ways to achieve the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner, keeping in view the security interests of all states.
Finally, it is incumbent on all member states and in particular the major powers, to demonstrate the necessary political will as well as a commitment to respect the security concerns of all states, in order for us to make progress and unblock the UN disarmament machinery. Pakistan stands ready to do so.
Thank you, Chairperson.