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Mr. President,
This item has been under consideration in the General Assembly for over a
decade. This delay is a reflection of the importance and complexity of the
issues involved.
2. There is general consensus that the Security Council’s composition and its
working methods are not democratic. Decisions are taken by a few. The five
permanent members, some more than others, exercise inordinate influence over the
Council’s decisions. Simultaneously, there is a visible concern at the
increasing concentration of the decision-making power in the Security Council in
relation to the other organs of the United Nations.
Mr. President,
3. The endeavour to improve the Security Council should be guided by a vision of
creating a new multilateralism which is democratic and cooperative – rather than
oligarchic and coercive. It must address the principal concerns of the UN’s
membership about the competence and sphere of responsibility of the Security
Council; its composition and representativeness; its decision-making and working
methods; its effectiveness and accountability.
4. First, the Council’s competence. The Security Council has been assigned the
primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security under the
Charter, specifically under Chapter-VI and VII. But the Charter clearly
stipulates that the Security Council acts on behalf of the General Assembly.
Consequently, the Council is accountable for its decisions and actions to the
“general membership”, which is represented in this General Assembly. Moreover,
the Security Council cannot exclude the Assembly from reviewing its work and
decisions; nor arbitrarily acquire exclusive competence over issues which do not
directly involve the maintenance of peace and security – such as terrorism,
disarmament and non-proliferation. A major endeavour of any UN reform process
must be to ensure the balance of responsibilities, envisaged under the Charter,
between the Security Council and the General Assembly.
5. Second, the Council’s decision-making. Both the Charter and the Council’s
“provisional” rules of procedures provide for discussion and decisions in open
meetings and in a transparent manner. It is only thus that States can be held
accountable for their positions and policies on the issues under consideration.
Unfortunately, over the past three decades, most of the Council’s deliberations
and decisions take place in closed “informal consultations”. Even the parties
directly involved in various conflicts and disputes are almost completely
excluded from participation in the deliberative and decision-making process. The
Council’s decisions are mostly ex-parte – derogating an essential principle of
“due process”. In the Council, initiatives emanate mostly from one or more of
five permanent members, or other small groupings of major powers (usually
designed as “friends” of the issue). The right of veto is usually exercised
informally and invisibly; and, more infrequently, openly, to ensure that the
Council’s decisions did not infringe the interests of the permanent members.
Given the binding nature of the Security Council’s decisions, the power of the
veto – explicit or implicit – is used pervasively to shape the international
policies and the behaviour of other States on an increasing number of issues.
6. The reform of the Security Council must prescribe ways and means to introduce
greater democracy and due process in its deliberations and decision-making. Open
meetings should be the rule and not the exception. The exercise of the veto must
be fully justified, including through a possible review by the Assembly and even
by the ICJ. Similarly, the Council’s decisions to take enforcement action under
Chapter-VII should be subjected to a periodic review by the UN General Assembly
to ensure against injustice and injury to less powerful nations.
7. Third, the composition of the Council. It is quite evident that the Security
Council’s current composition is not representative of the general membership.
While the five permanent members can be considered a separate and exceptional
category, the proportionate representation of the rest of UN membership has
become progressively worse over the last few decades. In 1945, leaving aside the
P-5, 46 UN Member States were represented by 6 elected States on the Council. A
proportion of 7.5 to 1. By 1951, when the Council’s expansion was proposed, 71
Member States were represented by 6 elected States. A proportion of 11.5 to 1.
By 1966, when the Council was enlarged to 15 members, 122 Member States were
represented by 10 elected States. A proportion of 12 to 1. Today, 186 States are
represented by 10 States. A proportion of 18 to 1. It is clear, therefore, that
the size of the elected members of the Security Council must be enlarged. It
should at least restore the proportion of 10 to 1. This would indicate the
addition of at least 10 new elected members, and thus a Security Council
composed of 25 Member States.
8. Secondly, the expansion should reflect the regional composition of the UN’s
general membership. Thus, the Council’s enlargement should accord larger
representation to Asia, Africa and Latin America, which are presently
under-represented in comparison to the other two regional groups.
9. Thirdly, the expansion should accord representation to those States which
have entered the United Nations after the last enlargement of the Council in
1966. These are mostly small and medium States. It is this vast majority of
small and medium States which comprise the general membership and constitute the
“new international realities”, not the larger States which seek for themselves
permanent membership of the Security Council.
Mr. President,
10. If the issue of enlargement had been guided by an objective approach,
agreement would have been reached several years ago. Unfortunately, consensus
has been frustrated by the ambitions of a few States which desire the privileged
status of the permanent five. This status was the result of a historical
agreement and is an unfortunate legacy with which the UN membership has had to
live. Our effort should be to temper the inequity and imbalance resulting from
this unfortunate legacy, not to compound it further by creating new centres of
privilege within the United Nations. New permanent members will not neutralize
the inordinate influence of existing permanent members. Two wrongs cannot make a
right. A larger oligarchy is no antidote to an elite power club. The unequal
power of the five can only be tempered by the combined endeavours of the general
membership, by adding a sufficient number of elected members who can influence
the deliberations and decisions of the Security Council. If 4 or 5 new permanent
members are added to a Council of 25, the rest of the UN membership – 181 States
– will continue to be grossly under represented in the Council. A proportion of
12 to 1.
11. Such an addition of new permanent members would thus further erode the
principle of sovereign equality and the concept of collective security enshrined
in the UN Charter. It will aggravate tensions within every regional group, since
the claim of each of the aspirants for permanent status is opposed by other
Member States from their own respective regions. It would exclude the equitable
participation of other States which have equal or better credentials for
permanent membership than some of the 4-5 self-nominated aspirants.
12. Already, the announcement of the so-called “G-4s” collective ambition has
provoked open divisions within and among regions. Several other countries have
declared their own candidatures. The Foreign Ministers of the Islamic countries
have declared that “any reform proposal, which neglects the adequate
representation of the Islamic Ummah, in any category of members in an expanded
Security Council, will not be acceptable to the Islamic countries”.
13. Moreover, the addition of new permanent members will further complicate
decision-making in the Security Council. Such decisions would have to
accommodate the interests of 9 or 10 permanent members rather than present five.
This would happen even if the ‘new’ permanent members agree to forego the right
of veto.
14. It is in view of such considerations that the NAM countries took the logical
position that “if there is no agreement on other categories of membership,
expansion should take place, for the time being, in the non-permanent category”.
Many countries outside the NAM also share this view.
Mr. President,
15. Enlargement in the category of non-permanent, elected members would adhere
to the principle of sovereign equality, ensure greater representation of the
general membership and promote greater democracy and accountability in the work
of the Security Council. Instead of a new “concert of power”, we must promote
the power of the principles of the UN Charter and the new paradigm of a
cooperative and democratic multilateralism through an enlarged and reformed
Security Council.
16. It is the hope of the Pakistan delegation that it is this approach which
will inspire the report and recommendations of the Secretary-General’s Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change. We hope that this Report will also help to
promote general consensus on the issue of Security Council reform and
enlargement. We are prepared, in this context, to consider new ideas and
approaches to promote consensus.
17. However, any effort to rush through a proposal on the sensitive issue of
Security Council enlargement through a vote at the General Assembly will be
manifestly divisive. It will defeat the very purpose of the Panel’s Report
which, as we understand, is to promote collective and unified action within a
united World Organization to address the new and old threats to peace and
security. It is the aspirations of the general membership, not the ambitions of
the few, that must drive the reform process.
18. Pakistan believes that the reform of the Security Council should be part of
the comprehensive UN Reform – including revitalization of the UN General
Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other UN Organs. The issue of
Security Council expansion cannot be considered in a piecemeal fashion divorced
from other issues, including the competence, decision-making, working methods
and accountability of the Security Council.
Mr. President,
19. The general membership must have the time and opportunity to consider the
issues and the Report and recommendations of the Secretary-General’s Panel. This
exercise must be conducted within this Assembly under your guidance. We should
aim at adopting comprehensive decisions on the Panel’s report, including on UN
Reforms by consensus at the High-Level Event next year, convened by the
Secretary-General, to mark the 60th Anniversary of the founding of the United
Nations
I thank you, Mr. President.