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Mr. Co-Chairman,
The September 2005 Summit condemned acts of terrorism committed wherever
and by whomsoever. The Summit decided that elements of a comprehensive
counter-terrorism strategy suggested by the Secretary-General would be
endorsed by the General Assembly.
2. Although the General Assembly did not solicit a Report from the
Secretary-General, we thank him for submitting this.
3. In the process of the Secretariat’s preparation of this Report, Pakistan
submitted a paper outlining its views and comments on the elements of a
Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Strategy. I am circulating a copy of
Pakistan’s paper along with this statement.
4. The Secretary-General’s Report focuses on the operational aspects of
counter-terrorism and contains some important and some controversial
proposals, on which we shall offer our comments. The report is focused,
however, too heavily on actions to be taken by and within the UN system – it
appears to be a strategy for the UN rather than Member States. The Report
does not deal with the really important and difficult issues i.e. a clear
definition of terrorism; the phenomenon of State Terrorism; and measures to
address the underlying or root causes of Terrorism. Unless these are
addressed, our Counter-Terrorism strategy will not be comprehensive; nor
will the international community succeed in eliminating terrorism.
5. As the distinguished Ambassador of Colombia has informed the meeting,
this Report was discussed extensively at a meeting of the Group of Friends
of UN Reform in Cartagena on 5 and 6 May. The agreed conclusions of the
Group have been circulated and, I believe, these will constitute an
important contribution to this process of consultations designed to
elaborate a comprehensive strategy.
6. As the Fox Group has stated the Secretary-General’s Report is to be
welcomed “as a contribution to the discussion” of a global Counter-Terrorism
strategy. While condemning terrorism in all its forms and manifestations,
and ruling out any justification for terrorism, the Group has noted the
necessity of addressing “extremist ideologies, violent conflicts, human
rights violations, religious and ethnic discrimination, political exclusion
and socio-economic marginalization…” As also noted, there is a need to agree
on an approach to the question of “root causes”, which was discussed at
length in Cartagena. The Secretary-General’s report offers a one possible
way forward in addressing the root causes of terrorism. But, in Pakistan’s
view, this is not sufficiently clear or comprehensive.
7. In Pakistan’s view, sooner or later, the international community will
have to evolve an agreed legally clear definition of terrorism. The Summit
was able to agree to condemn terrorism whenever and by whomsoever it is
committed. Yet, there are continuing attempts to circumscribe the scope of
terrorist actions, by seeking, in particular, to exclude the phenomenon of
the reality of “State Terrorism”.
8. During and after the Summit, I believe that everyone was prepared to
agree that all acts of deliberate violence against innocent civilians and
other non-combatants should be condemned and outlawed as terrorism,
regardless of their motivation or justification offered. Yet, agreement on a
definition escaped us because State military forces were sought to be
included in the category of “non-combatants”. In our view, such inclusion is
untenable in at least three circumstances.
9. One, where a State’s military is in occupation of a territory which is
not its own. The militaries of States in situations of foreign occupation
often resort to wanton violence against innocent civilians and other
non-combatants, including carpet-bombing or artillery bombardment of cities,
towns, villages, collective punishments, summary and arbitrary executions,
targeted assassination etc. These are surely acts of terrorism – State
terrorism.
10. A second exception is where States’ forces are engaged in a military
campaign to suppress the legitimate and recognized rights of peoples’ to
self-determination and independence. Here again, the action of a State’s
military are illegal under international law and violent actions against
innocent civilians and non-combatants should, therefore, be categorized as
terrorism, equally with such violence carried out by non-State actors.
11. A third situation of State Terrorism, perhaps more legally
controversial, is where a State’s forces are engaged in committing genocide,
war crimes or crimes against humanity, on their own territory.
12. The argument that the above-mentioned acts of violence by a State’s
military are outlawed by international law and, therefore, need not be
covered by the definition of terrorism, is special pleading and spurious.
Secondly, a State’s military should be subject to at least the same if not
higher standards of accountability as are applied to non-State groups that
resort to terrorism. Their exclusion would create a situation of legal and
political impunity that would enable States to use their military power for
repression and occupation of peoples whose legitimate resistance would,
ironically, be de-legitimized as “terrorism”.
13. There is a similar tendency, perhaps for the same reasons, to ignore the
root causes of terrorism. To address the root causes is not to justify
terrorism, but to understand it and thus to overcome it. We can kill or
capture terrorists; disrupt their operations; destroy their organizations;
but unless we prevent others from following their path, we cannot succeed in
comprehensively combating terrorism. To win the war against terrorism, we
must win the hearts and minds of those who are susceptible to sympathize and
support the tactics of terrorism.
14. The 2005 Summit, somewhat euphemistically, agreed to address the
“conditions conducive to terrorism”. The Secretary-General’s Report retreats
into further euphemism by seeking to address the “conditions that could be
exploited” by terrorists. Among these “conditions”, the Report refers to
“violent conflicts, human rights violations, religious and ethnic
discrimination, political exclusion and socio-economic marginalization.”
These categories broadly cover the “conditions” that give rise to terrorism.
Yet, the Report shies away from clearly listing these “conditions” or root
causes. Without such clarity, we shall not be able to succeed in addressing
such root causes.
15. Thus, it is true that ‘violent conflicts’ witness terrorism, both state
and non-state terrorism. The report, however, focuses mainly on internal
conflicts. Terrorism also often accompanies inter-state conflicts. But, more
importantly, the report fails to mention the evident reality that terrorism
occurs most often when a State’s overwhelming military power is being
utilized to occupy a weaker people or country or where it is being utilized
to suppress the legitimate right of a peoples to self determination, liberty
and freedom. Terrorism is most often utilized as a tactic of asymmetric
warfare, by the weak and the desperate. Ending terrorism thus implies ending
foreign military occupation and the violent suppression of
self-determination and freedom of other peoples. It is vital, therefore,
that any comprehensive strategy should address ways and means to resolve the
current outstanding situations of foreign occupation and the denial of the
legitimate right of peoples to self determination.
16. Pakistan agrees that extremist ideologies also lead to terrorism. The
strategy to address extremism must be different from the one against
terrorism. Terrorists we must confront’; extremists we should convert.
Pakistan has adopted a comprehensive strategy to address and overcome
religious and other extremism (outlined in paragraph 15 of our enclosed
paper). Although, it may take time, we are confident that, through such a
strategy, we shall succeed in overcoming extremists and move to fully
restore the moderation and tolerance that epitomized our Islamic society and
polity for centuries.
17. Yet, let us not pretend that religious and other extremism only exists
in the Islamic world. Such extremism is manifest today in all religions and
cultures. Globalization appears to accentuate rather than overcome
intolerance and extremism. The demonisation and defamation of Islam is the
defensive response of the ignorant and the bigoted. Those who seek
modernization in the Islamic world should themselves display moderation in
their characterization of Islam, its adherents and its Holy Prophet (PBUH).
Clearly, an honest and open dialogue among civilizations, especially between
Islam and the West, has become a political imperative. We should pursue this
dialogue through the Panel on the Alliance of Civilizations, led by Spain
and Turkey, as well as the initiative for Enlightened Moderation proposed by
President Musharraf of Pakistan.
18. The Secretary-General’s Report also rightly refers to “socio-economic
marginalization” among the conditions conducive to terrorism. While there
may not be a direct co-relationship between poverty and terrorism, it is
obvious that those who live in hunger and hopelessness are more prone to
become the foot soldiers of the terrorist groups and organizations. The
promotion of balanced socio-economic development, especially in regions
where extremism has arisen, should be high priority for the international
community. What is required is not self-serving critiques of the
socio-economic ills of Islamic societies, or the external imposition of
Western norms, but a major international effort – a new Marshall Plan, if
you will – to generate socio-economic dynamism and modernization in these
societies. Here too, Pakistan has achieved impressive results, generating
significant rates of economic growth and empowering our peoples – man and
women – from the grassroots up to elected provincial and national assemblies
even as we confront terrorism and address extremism.
19. The comprehensive strategy which we evolve can be envisioned, as the Fox
Group has envisioned, within a short, medium and longer-term framework. We
should, through these consultations, agree on the elements that could be
achieved within these three time perspectives. In the view of the Pakistan
delegation, the elements within these three time frames could include the
following:
i) In the short-term, the strategy could include operational actions such as
cooperation in police, intelligence and forensic fields, financial controls
and monitoring, border control, actions against organized crime and so on.
The Secretary-General’s report contains a number of proposals which can
serve to improve such operational policy to counter-terrorism. We shall
offer detailed comments on these proposals later.
ii) In the medium term, the strategy should aim to improve further
operational policies, including consideration of several proposals in the
Secretary-General’s Report. It could also seek to evolve the normative basis
for counter-terrorism, including a definition of terrorism, the adoption of
the counter-terrorism convention, measures to address – more practically –
the WMD-Terrorism matrix and initiate politically vigorous processes to
resolve the major conflicts and disputes that are currently fueling
terrorism and extremism.
iii) In the longer-term – perhaps a decade – the strategy could seek to
succeed in addressing extremism, promoting a successful dialogue among
civilizations and overcoming socio-economic stagnation and transformation in
the developing and Islamic world.
20. Finally, the strategy should envisage a clearer institutional framework
to ensure its implementation. Pakistan believes that the functions entrusted
to the Security Council were a necessary but stop-gap arrangement to enable
the international community to respond urgently to the terrorist threat.
However, we need to adopt institutional arrangements that are universally
accepted, governed and supervised by the UN General Assembly, thus involving
all Member States. In this context, Pakistan continues to support the
concept of creating an International Counter-Terrorism Centre as proposed by
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia.
I thank you Mr. Co-Chairman