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Mr. Co-Chairman,
I thank the Co-Chairs for the preparation of the draft elements for a “UN
Counter-Terrorism Strategy”.
2. We understand that it, in some ways, is compilation text which reflects
the views and suggestions offered by delegations in the informal discussions
held earlier on the Secretary-General’s Report.
3. We respect and appreciate the effort made by the two Co-Chairs to find
“common ground” in the document. In this context, I have two comments:
One, common ground can be found only once the legitimacy of the opposing
viewpoints is acknowledged and reflected in the negotiating process. The
draft elements, unfortunately, do not – at least explicitly – reflect the
priorities and proposal of certain delegations, including my country and
some other OIC countries, on important issues e.g. the definition of
terrorism; the need to address underlying causes, such as foreign occupation
and the suppression of self-determination; the issue of “state terrorism”;
the problem of insults and defamation of religions and cultures; the need
for vigorous international efforts to promote socio-economic development and
employment-creation to end extremism and terrorism. If agreement is to be
reached on the comprehensive strategy, these and other difficult issues will
have to be addressed and agreed approaches evolved.
Two, common ground is likely to be evolved not through ambiguous phraseology
or avoidance of “problem” issues through euphemisms. They can be resolved
only in an open and honest negotiating process. This negotiating process
cannot be short-circuited by the repeated and deliberate omission of the
difficult issues in the documents prepared for the consideration of member
States.
4. Second, even though the draft elements omit or avoid some difficult
issues, the document produced is, obviously, too long and too detailed to
serve as a “strategy”. Its focus is, like the Secretary-General’s report, on
operational details, rather than the normative and political issues on which
agreement is required for a “strategy” to provide value-addition to the
current efforts of the international community to combat terrorism.
5. Third, the structure of the document is somewhat confusing and perhaps
inadequate. Sections on an “introduction” and “guiding principles” are
obviously a good beginning. But, the division of the rest of the document
into the 3 Sections on “Measures” to (i) address “conditions conducive to
the spread of terrorism; (ii) prevent and combat terrorism; and (iii) ensure
respect for human rights, are too broad. Each of the three sections includes
“operational” and “policy measures” which are, in part at least, overlapping
and potentially contradictory.
6. Fourth, the provisions included under each part of the document are also
arbitrarily placed. Some of the provisions in the introduction could well be
included as “general principles”. Some of the “general principles” could be
included in the introduction and/or in one of the other 3 sections of the
document. Also, operational and policy measures are not always
distinguishable from each other and often amount to “exhortation” only (e.g.
to encourage; invite etc.)
7. Fifth, the draft elements – like the Secretary-General’s report – are
nicely focused on action within the UN. In our view, the purpose and value
of the exercise is to evolve a global strategy for agreed, coherent and
effective action by Member States; not only to promote coherence among the
proliferating activities of UN bureaucracies on terrorism.
8. Sixth, several of the words concepts, actions offered in the draft
elements – as also in the Secretary-General’s Report – need clarification,
legally and politically. For instance, there is no clarity on what
constitutes “instigation” of terrorism; “sanctuaries” for terrorists;
“victims of terrorism”. Some other words are loosely used e.g. “soft
targets”; internationally shared values”.
9. Seventh, the draft elements in several paragraphs want to “take note” of
the “intention” of the Secretary-General to take certain actions e.g. to
institutionalize the Counter-Terrorism Task Force. While we do not
necessarily disagree with the intended action, surely such actions need to
be approved by Member States, especially where they require the expenditure
of additional resources.
10. In my intervention in the earlier consultations, and in bilateral
contexts with you, Co-Chairs, we had suggested that a possibly useful
structure of the strategy document could be to group its provisions into 3
time-frames for realization: short, medium and long-term. We continue to
believe that such a structure could better capture all the elements of a
comprehensive strategy and also enable us to reach agreement on ways to
address some of the difficult or problem issues I have mentioned earlier.
11. In order to further illustrate this approach, my delegation has prepared
on outline of a possible strategy document, which I am circulating with this
statement. Our outline includes first: an introduction, which records the
background of our endeavour to evolve a strategy; second, sets out the
objectives of a comprehensive strategy; third, lists the “general
principles” for the strategy; fourth, sets out “Short-Term, Medium-Term and
Long-Term Measures, which include both operational, normative and policy
issues that could be achieved within the three time-frames. Finally, it
includes a section on institutional measures, both at the Secretariat and
inter-governmental levels.
12. I wish to emphasize that this is only a broad outline. But, we believe
it offers an idea of how we could differentiate the different issues in a
clear and coherent manner in a comprehensive strategy. The three timeframes
will, we believe, also enable us to address all issues, including the
difficult issues, by reflecting the degree of agreement that exists on each
and providing for processes designed to evolve full agreement on these
issues. It is only thus that we can hope to evolve a strategy that is
comprehensive and which can evoke the support of the widest possible
majority of Member States.
I thank you Mr. Co-Chairman