Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan, in the Joint Debate of the General Assembly on Item 9: Report of the Security Council; and Item 122: Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters (12 November 2007)

Mr. President,

  1. I would like to thank Ambassador Marty Natalegawa of Indonesia, President of the Security Council, for presenting the Council's Annual Report to the General Assembly.
  2. This joint debate is an important opportunity for the membership to undertake a strategic review of the work of the Security Council and of our collective efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of this body.
  3. The Security Council acts on behalf of the entire membership as the primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. The General Assembly must assess whether the Council was effective in maintaining international peace and security; did it reflect the views and interests of the entire membership; did it act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter?
  4. Paradoxically, while some believe that the Security Council is the only UN organ that "performs", there is also widespread dissatisfaction about its work and decisions.
  5. Transparency and openness could help to ease some of this dissatisfaction. Unfortunately, the Security Council's annual report, while providing a good statistical record, fails to offer sufficient information or analysis particularly with regard to its decision-making process. Decisions are evolved mostly in closed door sessions, if not behind the scenes by a few key States. The Council has not responded to the call for Special Reports on important issues. Nor is there a consistent effort to maintain institutional interaction with the General Assembly or the ECOSOC, for example, through regular briefings by the Security Council Presidency to the President of the General Assembly.
  6. The Security Council has been most effective, in recent years, in addressing internal crises and conflicts, mostly in Africa, and considerably less effective in resolving threats to and breaches of international peace and security which is its primary mandate.
  7. Peacekeeping has been utilized to good effect in several complex crises from Sierra Leone to Liberia, Burundi, DRC, Haiti and East Timor. Still, other situations, most notably Somalia have been grossly neglected for years. However, much more needs to be done to prevent conflicts from erupting in the first place, and to prevent relapse once a situation has been stabilized. In that regard, it is important to address the underlying causes of conflict and pursue more proactively a comprehensive approach focusing on post conflict peace-building and development. And the Council's actions must be conducted with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States concerned.
  8. As regards inter-state conflicts, the Council's record has been most unimpressive. Major unresolved issues, including in our own region, remain asleep on the agenda of the Security Council. Even in the case of some important issues on the active agenda, particularly the Middle East, the Council's role has been sidelined. It does not deal directly with some of the other major conflicts and threats to international peace and security. We have witnessed inaction and delay even in the face of most obvious acts of aggression and breaches of peace. We have witnessed double standards and selectivity; threats and use of force and other forms of coercion; non-implementation of certain Council's resolutions; and non-transparent, non-inclusive, partial and partisan decisions by the Council. This is where we have the starkest realization of the influence and control of some permanent members and other major powers which, in small and secretive conclaves, make decisions that primarily reflect their interests and which are often inconsistent with the priorities and aspirations of the vast majority of UN member states. It is therefore not surprising that, despite the revival of a greater number of public meetings of the Security Council, there has been little tangible improvement in transparency and understanding of the decision making process of the Council.

Mr. President,

  1. These are the issues around which revolves the other aspect of our debate today, i.e. the reform of the Security Council. The stated objectives of reform are to make the Council more representative, transparent, accountable and effective thus enhancing its legitimacy and credibility. The central and crucial question is whether we can achieve these objectives by enlarging the coterie of the powerful few, or by strengthening democratic representation, role and influence of the general membership of the UN in the Security Council. We believe the latter is the right and the only feasible approach.
  2. This belief is the basis for our principled opposition to any increase in permanent members of the Security Council. Indeed, most of the dissatisfaction with the Security Council can be attributed to the existence and role of the permanent members. We are therefore totally unconvinced by the argument that this dissatisfaction, and consequent erosion in the Council's credibility, will be resolved by adding more permanent members. On the contrary, the problems will be compounded by increasing the number of permanent members each one of which will seek to ensure the protection of its own national interest in the work of the Council. Indeed this would lead to a complete paralysis in the performance of the Council.
  3. Permanent membership for a few individual states will deny the opportunity for equitable representation to the rest of us. Only an acceptable formula with increase in non-permanent members and rotation can provide the means for such equitable representation for all States. Such rotation, combined with regional representation, may also offer possibilities for a fuller representation of countries members of various groups of states. This could better reflect the complex current realities - these current realities consist of a few large powers; a number of medium sized States; a majority of smaller States; and the emergence of regional organizations which are playing important roles in international and regional peace and security.
  4. The position of the Uniting for Consensus Group is flexible and realistic. It allows variable arrangements and different possibilities and options, including rotation and longer term presence, through re-election, and providing a greater relevance to regional representation. Such arrangements can also accommodate the interests of sub-regions such as the Arab Group, CARICOM and Central America, and political groups, such as the OIC, which has legitimate political and regional interests to promote and defend in the Council. The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Islamabad earlier this year reiterated the demand for adequate representation of the Islamic Ummah in any category of an expanded Security Council.
  5. Since, under any proposed scheme for Council expansion, new seats will be allocated to the regions, the countries of these regions should be able to determine the nature of representation on those seats. It is not for one or more major powers to determine such representation. Furthermore, equitable geographical distribution envisaged in Article 23 of the Charter would make little sense if a seat allocated to a region were to be occupied permanently by one country. That is why we respect and understand Africa's position. Africa's demand for "permanent seats" is for the entire region and is therefore different from other proposals that seek permanent membership for individual States. As we understand it, against the two empowered seats which are sought by Africa, representation on the Council could be from two or, through rotation, by a larger number of African states, under arrangements to be made by Africa itself. Africa would thus retain the power to ensure accountability on the part of those states which would represent it and act on its behalf on the Council. The African model of regional representation, if it is applied to all regions, appears to be an approach that may help to evolve agreement on Security Council reform. Using the African model, other regions could also be enabled to decide their own arrangements for representation of their respective regions on the Council.

Mr. President,

  1. We are all well aware of the history of the reform debate. Positions of member states and major interested groups on various aspects of Security Council reform are also well known. All support the objective of a comprehensive reform. Our leaders committed themselves to this objective in the Millennium Summit and the 2005 World Summit. However, major differences have persisted on the nature and the modalities of achieving reform.
  2. After years of impasse, there was a positive movement last year. The Uniting for Consensus members took the lead, launching the call for a negotiated solution, at a high level open meeting in New York co-hosted by the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of Italy on 20 September 2006. The subsequent process, led by President Haya Rashed Al Khalifa, assisted by several Facilitators, led to presentation of two Reports based on wide consultations with the entire membership. I would like to avail this opportunity to thank President Al Khalifa and her Facilitators for their important and sincere contribution. The Facilitators' Reports concluded that: i) none of the past proposals had the required support; ii) in order to be implementable, any reform formula must garner the widest possible political acceptance of the membership, in any case well above the required 2/3rd majority; and iii) a compromise intermediate approach was the only feasible option. The Reports were generally welcomed and appreciated as constituting significant progress on the reform issue. The Secretary General in his report on the work of the organization (A/62/1) also noted the main recommendation of the Facilitators that the member states consider an "intermediary approach" as a "compromise solution" with a view to unblocking the process.
  3. To achieve further progress, we must build upon the progress achieved so far, particularly in the 61st Session, as reflected in the Reports of the Facilitators. This was decided by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the OEWG. It was also decided that the Working Group should continue efforts during the 62nd Session aimed at achieving "general agreement" among member states in the consideration of all issues relevant to Security Council reform. These are the parameters of the framework for next steps in this reform process.
  4. The difficulties faced in adopting the report of the OEWG last year illustrated how divisive this issue can become. The positive dynamic and the progress achieved through the Facilitators' process were almost derailed by the unilateral draft resolution submitted by some states. That move gathered weak support, and the report was eventually adopted by consensus. However, that unilateral and partisan move eroded the confidence and trust in the process. We will need to rebuild that confidence and mutual trust. We are therefore disturbed that professions of flexibility are accompanied by reiteration of demands that are clearly unacceptable, and by assertions that the decisions will be taken by a vote.
  5. The UfC believes that the reform issue can only be advanced through an approach based on consensus building and garnering the widest possible support of the membership, both with regard to substance and process. We support negotiations. Indeed, the UfC group was the first to call for negotiations. However, negotiations should lead to agreement, not to a vote. And, to ensure a successful outcome, negotiations must be carefully planned and prepared.
  6. In the first place, there must be clarity and agreement on the basis, parameters, framework and conditions for negotiations. This should include confidence building measures to assure against unilateral moves and pre-emptive initiatives that could disrupt the process.
  7. Based on the recommendations agreed at the last UNGA, the following four elements should serve as the parameters for intergovernmental negotiations envisaged by the General Assembly:
  1. We believe, you as President of the Assembly should hold informal consultations to determine the conditions and framework for negotiations. As has been practice in the past, you could appoint one or more vice chairs of the OEWG to assist you in the process. But we urge you, Mr. President, to strongly discourage the culture of putting draft resolutions and threats of voting as a means of achieving what needs to be discussed and agreed in negotiations. There can be no discussions and negotiations in an environment of threat, coercion and pressure.

Mr. President,

  1. The UfC is keen to build on the progress so painstakingly achieved during the last session. But artificial deadlines will once again divided us. We are confident that under your guidance we will be able to carry our work forward in an atmosphere of trust and mutual confidence to achieve a compromise negotiated solution through the broadest possible agreement of member states. We are ready and willing to work with you in the pursuit of this objective.

Thank you.