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Mr. Chairman,
The end of the Cold War in the closing years of the last Century generated
widespread hope for peace and prosperity. Unfortunately, such hope for a “peace
dividend” was short lived. The 21st Century dawned, as the last, with a world
beset by conflict and destruction, among and within States. What is different
today is that globalization has made every conflict and every catastrophe
“international” in its impact and implications. And, there is no coherent global
policy to “regulate” armaments, arrest proliferation and promote disarmament.
2. Today, threats to peace and challenges to arms control and disarmament arise
from several sources.
Mr. Chairman,
3. International terrorism, and the possibility of the use of weapons of mass
destruction by terrorists, constitute a threat to all States, including the most
powerful. This resort to the asymmetric instrument of terrorism is, in part at
least, a consequence of growing asymmetry in power and the inability of the
international system to eliminate political injustice and the unjust suppression
of peoples in many parts of the world, especially in the Islamic world. While
the international campaign against terrorism has been effective, and cooperation
to counter it is growing, we have yet to initiate a comprehensive strategy to
address and eliminate its root causes.
4. Pakistan agrees that all efforts must be made to prevent terrorists and other
non-state actors from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction. In our
view, the conclusion of a non-discriminatory and universal treaty would be the
most effective instrument to counter this threat. Pakistan agreed to the
adoption of resolution 1540 by the Security Council as an interim measure to
foster national action by member states to prevent the acquisition of WMD
capability by non-state actors, especially terrorists.
5. Pakistan has adopted comprehensive measures to prevent WMD proliferation.
- We have taken effective steps, in cooperation with the international
community, to eliminate an underground proliferation network which had its
tentacles in two dozen countries. We are cooperating closely with the IAEA in
this endeavour. We urge other concerned countries to do likewise.
- Pakistan has adopted wide ranging measures to ensure foolproof security for
its nuclear and strategic assets. Four years ago, we established a Nuclear
Command and Control Authority which is responsible for Pakistan’s strategic
assets. These assets are vital for our strategic deterrence posture. There is no
question of their falling into the wrong hands.
- We have also created a Nuclear Regulatory Authority for the safe operation of
civilian nuclear plants.
- Pakistan has elaborated legislation to implement its obligations under the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
- Last month, Pakistan’s Parliament promulgated a comprehensive Export Control
Act to deal with nuclear and biological weapons, material, goods, technologies,
equipment and their means of delivery. Salient elements of our new law include:
prohibition of diversion of controlled goods and technologies, including
re-export, transshipment and transit; licensing and record keeping; export
control lists and penal provisions of up to 14 years imprisonment and a fine of
Rs. 5 million. We are confident that there will be no proliferation of WMD from
Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman,
6. While the threat of WMD terrorism creates fear and foreboding, people are
dying and suffering each day as a result of “small wars” conducted mainly by
“small arms”. A host of “complex crises” in Africa and other parts of the
developing world are exacerbating national and international security, creating
major humanitarian emergencies, and neutralizing economic progress. A host of
measures have been initiated to address these crises, including the UN Programme
of Action against illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. These crises need to be
addressed in a comprehensive manner, through conflict resolution, ending
external intervention, and halting the illegal exploitation of natural resources
which motivate and fuel many of these conflicts.
7. There are other regional situations and conflicts which portend even greater
danger. In the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli confrontation is aggravated by the
threat of proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. Preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the
Middle East needs to be addressed in a comprehensive and cooperative framework.
No one can ignore that nuclear weapons and their means of delivery already exist
in the region. We trust that the current controversy relating to the nuclear
programme of a country in the region will be addressed in a cooperative
framework. Pakistan supports the fulfillment of international obligations by all
States. We also support the objective of creating a zone free of weapons of mass
destruction in the Middle East.
8. It is essential to prevent the emergence of nuclear weapons on the Korean
Peninsula and avoid an extended arms race with grave portents for peace and
stability in North-East Asia. We support the six party talks initiated and
hosted by China. Concerted efforts must be made to ensure the success of these
talks with the objectives of ensuring a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons
and addressing the security concerns and economic aspirations of all the States
concerned.
9. In South Asia, the security environment has visibly improved in recent months
with the initiation of a composite dialogue between India and Pakistan. We
believe that a durable peace and security in South Asia will require an earnest
effort to: one, resolve outstanding disputes, particularly Jammu & Kashmir; two,
promote mutual nuclear restraint; and three, maintain a balance of conventional
forces between Pakistan and India.
10. Peace and security is an important item on the agenda of the composite
dialogue. Both India and Pakistan are committed to work for “strategic
stability”. They have declared that their nuclear capability is a factor for
stability in South Asia. They are committed to taking the measures necessary to
reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. We have
agreed on a number of nuclear confidence building measures, including
improvement of hotlines, prior notification of missile flight tests, and
reaffirmation of our unilateral test moratoriums. Further confidence building
measures are to be discussed.
11. Pakistan believes that several other, more ambitious, measures for mutual
nuclear and missile restraint can be agreed, such as:
- maintenance of nuclear weapons on de-alert status;
- no operational deployment of nuclear ballistic missiles;
- no acquisition or deployment of Anti-Ballistic Missile
systems;
- avoidance of a nuclear and missile arms race.
12. A balance in the conventional defence capabilities of the two countries is
essential for strategic stability and durable peace, especially since their
forces are mainly deployed against each other. An arms imbalance can create
temptations for coercion and aggression. It can increase the dangers of
catastrophe inherent in a nuclearized South Asia. We hope India will accept the
confidence-building measures suggested by Pakistan to enhance strategic
stability in the conventional field; agree to avoid a ruinous arms race; temper
its weapons acquisition; and agree to maintain an acceptable ratio of forces
with Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman,
13. The crisis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime arises not only from the
apparent intention of some to acquire nuclear weapons but, even more so from the
tension between nuclear legality and nuclear reality. This tension is apparent
in 3 major areas:
14. One, the 5 nuclear weapon States have undertaken a legal commitment, under
Article VI of the NPT, to achieve nuclear disarmament. Some progress has been
made towards reducing strategic arsenals. But, over 20,000 nuclear weapons are
still held, mostly on high alert, by the two largest nuclear weapon States.
Moreover, it seems clear that the nuclear powers intend to retain their nuclear
weapons “for the foreseeable future”. A credible programme for nuclear
disarmament, within a reasonable timeframe, is indispensable to revive the
essential “bargain” which is at the heart of the NPT. Any regime which seeks to
perpetuate discrimination, and ignores the vital security interests of the
majority of States, cannot be sustained indefinitely.
15. Two, the NPT recognizes only 5 nuclear weapons States. In reality, there are
3 other states which posses nuclear weapons. These three States are also
unlikely to give up their nuclear weapons “for the foreseeable future” outside
the framework of a programme of global nuclear disarmament or regional arms
control and conflict resolution. In their joint statement in June this year,
Pakistan and India have declared that their nuclear capabilities are essential
for regional stability. Endeavours to insist on their adherence to the NPT as
non-nuclear States are unrealistic. Attempts to persuade them, through penal
measures or technology denial are likely to be fruitless and could damage the
prospects of creating a credible global non-proliferation regime. Unless the
cooperation of the 3 nuclear weapon states which remain outside the NPT is
evoked through mutual agreement, there will remain a gaping hole in the NPT
regime. We note with interest that IAEA Director-General has recently called for
the inclusion of the three non-NPT nuclear states in future talks on
non-proliferation and disarmament.
16. Three, the NPT “bargain” essentially involved the acceptance by its
non-nuclear parties of the temporary retention of nuclear weapons by 5 nuclear
weapon states in exchange for the promise of nuclear disarmament; as well as
full cooperation in the development and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
Since the nature of such peaceful nuclear cooperation was not elaborated in the
NPT, many of the advanced non-nuclear parties have developed or acquired the
complete nuclear fuel cycle, including, enrichment and reprocessing technologies
which create the capability for nuclear weapons development. The international
community is now belatedly concerned about the spread of these sensitive parts
of the nuclear fuel cycle to other States even under international safeguards.
It is clear that such double discrimination is difficult to justify. Equitable
solution must be found, through political and technological means, not coercion
or the use of force. We believe that the Experts Group convened by the IAEA
Director-General should evolve practical solutions to ensuring the safety of the
nuclear fuel cycle. Meanwhile, political steps, including security assurances,
may offer the means to regulate the sensitive parts of the nuclear cycle in
civilian nuclear programmes.
17. Pakistan suggests the convening of an International Conference to address
and remove the current tensions between nuclear legality and nuclear reality in
the three areas I have outlined.
Mr. Chairman,
18. There are several other worrying aspects on the global proliferation and
disarmament scene:
- the absence of international agreement on missiles. Unfortunately, the Hague
Code of Conduct does not address the
concerns of several militarily significant States;
- the dangers which may arise from “war fighting” nuclear doctrines and reports
regarding the further qualitative development of “useable” nuclear weapons;
- the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems which could
destabilize deterrence stability, including in South Asia;
- the steady militarization of Outer Space. Unless a global regime is agreed,
Outer Space is likely to become the major theatre of a new global arms race.
19. It is obvious, that these global challenges to stability, disarmament and
non-proliferation can be addressed only in multilateral negotiations. The
complex of disarmament and non-proliferation threats – in the regional as well
as global context – has never been greater. There is no substitute for
multilateral legal norms which enjoy universal legality or acceptance, even if
the negotiation of international treaties, with effective verification
provisions, are often time consuming and complex. Freely negotiated
international treaties are the necessary sheet-anchor for effective arms
control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Decisions promulgated in exclusive
and limited bodies representing the views, interests and perspectives of the few
and the powerful do not enjoy universal commitment and are thus lacking in the
legitimacy which can only be offered by international treaties.
Mr. Chairman,
20. Therefore, it is now imperative to revive the Conference on Disarmament and
restore its role as “the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament.”
The impasse in the CD is artificial. We are unable to decipher the reluctance,
on the part of some, to simultaneously address the issues of proliferation and
disarmament. The work programme of the CD must include the negotiations of a
fissile material treaty, encompassing existing stockpiles and an effective
verification mechanism. It must also include measures to prevent the
militarization of Outer Space and the negotiation of a realistic programme of
nuclear disarmament to which nuclear powers have committed themselves under
Article VI of the NPT and at its last Review Conference. Moreover, until nuclear
disarmament is achieved, security guarantees to non-nuclear weapon States can
provide a most effective tool to reduce the incentives for WMD proliferation.
The desire to address comprehensively the major threats to international
security and disarmament within the CD cannot be dismissed as “linkages”. On the
contrary, it is only such a comprehensive and global endeavour for disarmament
and non-proliferation that can evoke the support of the international community.
Mr. Chairman,
21. Pakistan supports efforts to improve the effectiveness of the working
methods of the United Nations disarmament machinery, including the First
Committee. Such efforts must involve, first and foremost, the revival of the
Conference on Disarmament to play its assigned role as the sole multilateral
negotiating forum. It must also involve the full utilization of the UN
Disarmament Commission and the First Committee for discussion of major
disarmament and non-proliferation problems. These deliberative bodies can serve
to evolve the basis for negotiation of international agreements on various
outstanding and emerging threats of proliferation and challenges to genuine
disarmament. They must not be marginalized.
22. As regards the First Committee, we believe that its reform efforts must be
pursued within the following parameters:
a) The political role of the First Committee must be
enhanced.
b) The approach should be incremental and build upon
progressive steps.
c) There should be better and more efficient time management.
d) All decisions must be reached by consensus.
23. However, truncated change is likely to introduce distortions in the
functioning of the Assembly. Efforts to improve the functioning of the First
Committee cannot be divorced from the measures under consideration for the
revitalization of the General Assembly and its other Committees.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.